







« Informational Advantage and Influence  


























Informational Advantage and Influence  




















This paper studies empirically whether first the central bank has an informational advantage 
over the private sector and second influences it, for five countries in which the central bank 
publishes forecasts. It contributes to the literature in two ways. The first set of results show 
that only one out of five communicating central banks benefits from private information. The 
main outcome concerns the sources of this advantage: the impacts of advance knowledge of 
the future policy path and secrecy are minimized, while specific expertness seems reinforced. 
The second set of results show that three out of five central banks have influential power on 
private sector through forecasts’ publication. This paper suggests then that there is no 
relationship between informational advantage and influence, that is central banks need not 
to be more informed to be influential. 
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In the last decades, there has been a strong interest for transparency and information issues 
in monetary policy emphasizing the role of expectations in policy outcomes. A part of this 
literature has focused on the theoretical effects of imperfect information of private agents or 
the central bank on monetary policymaking. Informational advantage of the central bank on 
the future state of the economy might allow stabilizing policies. This has led many authors, 
following Romer and Romer (2000), to assess in the US which has the lowest forecast errors 
between the private sector and the Federal Reserve, a central bank that keep secret its 
forecasts for five years.  
The first contribution of this paper is to test empirically whether central banks 
communicating their forecasts do, indeed, have private information. From this analysis, we 
investigate possible sources of private information (through comparisons between diverse 
central banks in terms of strategy or communication) and assess as a corollary if private 
information is sustainable with communication or depends on secrecy. Furthermore, we 
deduce in parallel whether communication of information tends to improve private agents’ 
ability to forecast, according to the theoretical debate on the implications of release of 
information, positive for Morris and Shin (2002) and Svensson (2006) and negative 
according to Amador and Weill (2008). 
T h e  s e c o n d  g o a l  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t o  c o n t r i b u te to the literature by analysing in the five 
countries considered whether the central bank has influence on the private sector. 
Independently from asymmetry of information, testing whether the central bank forecasts 
are influential allows to determine the direction of the leader-follower scheme of the 
monetary process. Indeed, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have shown that a monetary 
policy influenced by private expectations may lead to indeterminacy. Influential central bank 
is moreover supposed to make, due to its impact on private expectations, monetary policy 
implementation more effective. At the other hand, Muto (2008) argues that when private 
agents follow the central bank, this one must respond more strongly to expected inflation to 
achieve expectational stability. As an extension, we determine whether this potential 
influence arises from private information. 
 
We then exploit data collected from five developed countries, namely the United Kingdom, 
Japan, Sweden, Canada and Switzerland, for which central banks communicate their 
forecasts, and use surveys of Consensus Forecasts for private sector forecasts. We find that 
only one out of five communicating central banks, the Riksbank from Sweden, has an 
informational advantage. When comparing these communicating central banks and the 
Federal Reserve, advance knowledge of future policy path, secrecy and the institutional 
framework appear not to be sufficient conditions for superior forecasts accuracy compared to 
private agents. Moreover, forecasts’ communication from the central bank does not seem to 
improve private agents’ forecasting capacity. Results about the influential power of the one’s 
forecasts on the other’s show that in three out of five countries, Sweden, the UK and Japan, 
the central bank influences the private sector, while evidence is mixed for Switzerland and 
Canada. There is therefore no indication of a relationship between private information and 
influential power. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and empirical 
literature related to these issues. Section 3 presents central banks’ and private agents’ 
forecasts. Section 4 displays the tests and results concerning information asymmetry, while 
Section 5 regroups tests and results for influence. Section 6 concludes this paper.    4
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper deals with two strands of literature: the first concerns forecasts’ accuracy of 
central banks compared to private sector and so theoretical impact of asymmetry of 
information in monetary policymaking. While imperfect information1 from the central bank 
generally reinforces the case for commitment and aggressive response to inflation, 
information advantage in favour of the central bank deviates from the optimal monetary 
policy under rational expectations hypothesis by considering stabilizing real effects for 
monetary policy. The empirical work undertaken here tries then to give insight on the 
direction of a potential information advantage. For this, it lies on the seminal work of Romer 
and Romer (2000) finding Greenbook (from Federal Reserve) forecasts are superior to private 
sector forecasts. Gavin and Mandal (2001), Sims (2002), and Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 
(1998, 2003) supports this analysis, while Joutz and Stekler (2000), Atkeson and Ohanian 
(2001), Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004), Baghestani (2008) and to a lesser extent 
Amornthum (2006) arrive at a different conclusion. Hubert (2008) gathers methodologies, 
data and samples to show that Federal Reserve possesses an informational advantage on 
inflation, but not on GDP. 
 
Outside the US, a few articles assess the potential informational advantage of the central 
bank with the private sector. In the UK, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) analyse the Survey 
of External Forecasters (SEF) and finds that its average point forecasts of inflation 
outperforms the Monetary Policy Committee’s forecast, while comparisons for GDP growth 
show little difference. They note that SEF error is smaller than any (regular) individual error 
what supports pooled surveys. Casillas-Olvera and Bessler (2006) find a similar result with 
density forecasts. Last, Groen, Kapetanios and Price (2008) compare Bank of England (BoE 
hereafter)’s forecasts to real time model forecasts, but not to private forecasts. They find that 
simple univariate models do better than BoE’s GDP forecasts, while inflation forecasts of the 
BoE strongly dominate. To my knowledge, there is no other empirical assessment of 
informational asymmetry between the central bank and private sector, except some boxes in 
Inflation Reports by the Bank of England and the Riksbank. It can be mentioned that 
Andolfson et al. (2007) compare forecasting performance of the Riksbank to BVAR and 
DSGE models. Those ones appear to outperform the former. 
 
Second, a vast literature deals with the costs and benefits to publish forecasts, among which 
Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), Geraats (2002, 2005), Woodford (2005) and Eusepi and 
Preston (2007). Forecasts, with the development of inflation targeting policies, have become a 
central tool of central banks communication. However, only a few papers assess empirically 
whether there is influence from central banks to private agents trough forecasts and 
theoretical considerations associated. Indeed, poor forecasting performance can impair 
central bank’s credibility and mislead private agents, while influential and accurate forecasts 
might improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. Thus, Fujiwara (2005) shows on 
Japanese data that the Bank of Japan influences private forecasters while the opposite is not 
true.  Kelly (2008) assesses the causal relationship between inflation and inflation 
expectations through Granger causality tests in the UK and finds that while before inflation 
targeting has been introduced in the UK, expectations and inflation were linked, after its 
setting-up (and communication of forecasts), this link disappear and it causes public to 
                                                 
1 See Hubert (2008) for a more detailed review of literature on impacts of informational advantage in favour of 
private agents or central banks.   5
anchor their expectations. Likewise, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) find that private 
forecasters have a tendency to follow the BoE for GDP growth forecasts, but not for inflation. 
Last,  Muto (2008) sets a framework in which private agents refer to the central bank’s 
forecasts. Considering central bank’s forecast errors repeated by private agents, it must then 
respond more strongly to inflation. In order to analyze theoretical implications of influence, 
it is thus necessary to identify empirically whether it is the private sector or the central bank 





We focus on five developed countries for which the central bank publishes forecasts: 
Sweden, the UK, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. Some initial and general remarks are 
worth to be made before to focus on the characteristics of each data2 set. 
First, as emphasized in the previous section, we analyze potential informational advantage 
and influence through forecasts, since it is a hypothesis commonly accepted in the literature 
that forecasts of central banks and private agents map all information available to them. We 
then take those officially published by central banks and surveys of professional forecasters 
or consumers for the private sector. For these surveys, we consider the mean of the point 
forecasts3 collected.  
Second, two types of forecasts exist: fixed-event scheme and fixed-horizon scheme. The 
second is not contaminated by the effects of varying lead time and it is generally agreed that 
it is the most appropriate format to compare forecasts between them. For Sweden, the UK 
and Canada, the main forecasts on which we focus are at fixed horizon. For Japan and 
Switzerland, the only forecasts available from the central bank are for fixed events: the 
current and next years.  
Third, we compare forecasts of central banks to individual private forecasts for the country, 
Sweden, for which we have comparable annual average data from central bank and private 
forecasters, the longest data and incentives to do so.4 
Fourth, the period considered here falls within the great moderation period and predates the 
impact of the commodities price rise and fall and turbulence in financial markets. It could 
then be argued that the task of forecasters is made easier. However first, even if this was 
true, we here compare forecasters’ performance between them ceteris paribus. Second, Stock 
and Watson (2007) show this assumption is not relevant as it is very difficult to beat simple 
and naïve forecast models during macroeconomic stability. Discrepancy between private 
sector and the central bank over a stable sample would then be even more significant. 
 
For Sweden, the Riksbank provides two types of forecasts5: 12-month change at different 
quarters in the future and average annual change for the current and next calendar years. 
                                                 
2 Tests of stationary have been conducted for each group of series: the null hypothesis that each variable assumes 
a unit root process is always rejected at the 10% level and most of the time at the 5% level. The investigation is 
carried out with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s and Phillips and Perron’s tests. The latter proposes an alternative 
(nonparametric) method of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. These results are 
available upon request. 
3 Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2008) find point forecasts are in general more optimistic (lower inflation and 
higher output growth) than corresponding density forecast mean. However, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) note 
that analyses of errors in the density forecast mean and in point forecasts are similar. 
4 Comparison of aggregate forecasts shows a clear advantage in favour of the central bank. The question is 
whether this advantage holds only on some forecasters or on a large majority. When forecasts of the central bank 
and the mean of the private sector are closer, the rationale for individual comparisons is weaker as there will be 
inevitably some forecasters’ errors smaller and higher.   6
The former are regularly available for inflation (CPI) for forecasts 1 year (Q+4) and 2 years 
(Q+8) ahead from 1997Q1 and for all quarters from the current one to Q+6 from 1999Q3. 
Concerning GDP, from current quarter to Q+6 forecasts are available since 2003Q4. The 
average annual change forecasts are available for both inflation and GDP since 1997. 
The 12-month rate forecasts in 1 year and 2 years ahead are compared to private forecasts 
gathered via a survey by Prospera AB available since 1996Q1 for inflation and used then 
since 1997Q1. It is only available for GDP since 2006Q4 and is then not used in this paper. 
These forecasts are split in two categories: All respondents to the survey and Market Players. 
The 12-month rate forecasts in current and next 6 quarters are compared to the quarterly 
forecasts gathered by Consensus Forecasts. These are available since 1999Q2 for both 
inflation and GDP. 
For these quarterly forecasts comparison, Inflation Reports which contain forecasts of the 
Riksbank are in average published around March 16th, June 8th, October 10th and December 
7th, surveys of Consensus Forecasts in first half of March, June, September and December and 
those of Prospera AB in beginning of March, end of May, beginning of October and end of 
November. Timing of release is then not here a controversial issue. 
The average annual rate forecasts of current and next calendar years are compared to the 
same measure available from Consensus Forecasts since 1999 on the fixed-event scheme. We 
compare to the mean of Consensus Forecasts and to major individual forecasters6. The 
calendar forecast is compiled as the average of all forecasts made for a year during the 
preceding and the current ones (except the forecast of December for the current year because 
the Riksbank already focus on two next years in each December report). For instance, for the 
year 2001, we compare the forecasts of March, June, September, December 2000, March, June, 
and September 2001. 
 
For the UK, the BoE publishes year-over-year forecasts for current to next 8 quarters for only 
inflation since 1993Q1 with a scenario based on a constant interest rate and for both inflation 
and GDP as from 1998Q1 with 2 scenarios: the latter and a scenario based on the interest rate 
expected by the market7. Moreover, the measure of inflation has been RPIX until 2003Q4 and 
CPI-H since 2004Q1.  
These forecasts can be compared to three types of private forecasts: first, those of Consensus 
Forecasts available until the 6th future quarter since 1999Q2 for both inflation and GDP. The 
switch from RPIX to CPI-H is here made in 2005Q1. Second, a survey of public attitudes to 
inflation is conducted by Gfk NOP and the BoE and provides private forecasts of inflation 
one year ahead since 1999Q4. Third, the BoE gathers, in each Inflation Report, inflation and 
GDP forecasts of “other forecasters” in 2 years ahead (called the SEF, that is in average 25 
institutions, banks and miscellaneous forecasters), since 1998Q1 for inflation and 1998Q4 for 
GDP. The switch between both inflation measures is here in 2004Q1. Last, because of the 
change of measure for inflation, we separate the analysis of inflation forecasts’ accuracy in 
two subsamples for comparisons with Consensus Forecasts: the first concerning RPIX until 
2003Q4 and the second for CPI-H from 2005Q1, because the two institutions do not forecast 
the same measure of inflation in the year 2004. 
                                                                                                                                                         
5 Riksbank’s forecasts have been based before October 2005 on a constant interest rate scenario, until February 
2007 on implicit forward rates (interest rate expected by financial markets), and since then on Riksbank’s 
preferred path for the future interest rate. 
6 Are considered as major forecasters those who respond to more than two third of surveys. 
7 We report Mean Square Errors for both types of forecasts but focus afterwards on the constant interest rate 
scenario (unconditional). Woodford (2000) argues that forecasts based on forecasts of the private sector give too 
much weight to forward-looking variables when policymaking and Faust and Leeper (2005) show that 
unconditional forecasts are more effective communication tools then conditional forecasts. Faust and Wright 
(2008) provide specific tests for conditional forecasts and consider these types of forecast “represent a substantial 
impediment to the analysis of their quality”.     7
Finally, the issue of the timing of publications is here in advantage of Consensus Forecasts, 
which consistently releases its surveys one month after the BoE.  
 
For Canada, the Inflation Reports are published in January, April, July and October of each 
year and provide projections of the real GDP at average annual rate since 2002Q3 and 
forecasts of Total CPI and real GDP at year-over-year rate for current and next four quarters 
respectively since 2003Q2 and 2005Q2. 
We compare the 12-month rate quarterly forecasts with similar projections made by 
Consensus Forecasts (CF). The timing of publication is however different: these quarterly 
forecasts are published in March, June, September and December. There is then strong 
timing disadvantage (and then information disadvantage) for Bank of Canada (BoC 
hereafter). It seems more logical to compare CF’s forecasts from the preceding quarter to the 
BoC’s forecasts of a current quarter than both in the current quarter. Indeed, CF’s forecasts 
from quarter q-1 are closer to BC’s forecasts of quarter q (a gap of 1 month between both) 
than to BC’s forecasts of quarter q-1 (2 months gap). We therefore provide comparisons on 
the standard basis (the ‘base specification’ in the table) and with a timing correction.  
Last, we compare on a fixed event scheme forecasts of the mean of average annual rate 
forecasts of real GDP provided by Consensus Forecasts to the equivalent forecasts made by 
the BoC.  
 
For Japan, the central bank publishes, only two times by year, in the last days of April and 
October the lower and higher forecasts of the majority of policy board members, for real 
GDP and CPI excluding fresh food at an average annual rate basis. These forecasts are 
available for the current year since October 2000 and for next year at a regular frequency 
only since October 20048. We take for this study the middle point of the range that very 
regularly coincides with the median forecast which has started to be published more 
recently.  
The forecasts of the private sector are taken from Consensus Forecasts. They publish at the 
beginning of each month the forecasts of various institutions and we then take the survey of 
early May and November, for which the publication gap between both institutions is the 
smallest. 
 
For Switzerland, the central bank publishes twice a year since 1999Q4 and on a quarterly 
basis since 2003Q1 forecasts of CPI for current, next year and the following one. We compare 
them to the Consensus Forecasts of current and next year calculated on the same basis: 
annual average rate. The Swiss National Bank publishes its Inflation Reports in March, June, 




4. Measures of Potential Informational Advantage 
 
In this section, we assess the accuracy of forecasts provided by both the central bank and the 
private forecasters in order to measure the direction and the size of a potential informational 
advantage. We apply two standard methods: the Mean Square Error and regressions in the 
spirit of Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer (2000). 
 
 
                                                 
8 For this reason, there is very little data available and we then report only MSE for next year forecasts and 
exclude them from regressions.   8
Mean Square Errors 
The simplest method to compare forecasts accuracy of both institutions is to measure their 
Mean Square Errors. In order to calculate the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that 
central bank’s and private forecasts’ MSE are equal, we estimate according to Romer and 
Romer (2000) the following regression: 
22 () ()
hh
th t th t t YC B YP S α ε ++ −− −= +  
where  α is the difference between the squared errors of forecasts of both institutions and 
then allows to calculate the standard errors of α corrected for serial correlation with the 
Newey-West HAC method9. We can thus obtain a robust p-value  for the test of the null 




The second method consists of regressing the actual inflation on forecasts made by both 
institutions in order to know whether the Greenbook’s forecasts contain information that 
could be useful to private agents to form their forecasts. This method is applied from Fair 
and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer (2000). The point as described by the latter is 
to see if individuals who know the private sector forecasts could make better forecasts if they 
also knew the central banks’ ones. The regression takes the following form: 
hh
th C B t P S t t YC B P S α ββε + =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + 
Where  th Y +  is the actual value of inflation or GDP,
h
t CB is the forecast made by the central 
bank and 
h
t PS by the private sector in date t for h horizons later. The main idea behind this 
regression is then to see if central bank’s forecasts contains useful information to forecast 
inflation or GDP and more useful information than the one given by private sector’s 
forecasts by testing whether  CB β is significantly different from zero, whether  CB β is near to 1 
and  CB β is different and higher than PS β . Standard errors are here again computed using the 
Newey-West’s HAC methodology to correct serial correlation. 
 
We present for each country the MSE for every comparable measure published, while we 
restrict the regression analysis to the longest and most regular data. Concerning the length of 
samples, availability and compatibility of data determines our sample. Although the 
available time series are relatively short (most of central banks that publishes forecasts 
started in late nineties or in this decade), the general sample corresponds to a period in 
which inflation has been very stable. There is then no problem of credibility of the central 
bank and its decisions (for instance, private agents’ views that central banks won’t succeed to 
fight strong inflation in the beginning of the eighties) that could have favor central banks to 
the detriment of private sector. The sample is stable here and rules out the Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001)’s remark on this point. 
 
Robustness 
In order to check that regressions are not distorted by multicollinearity (forecasts are indeed 
highly correlated between themselves) as discussed by Granger and Newbold (1977), the 
actual variable is regressed on only one forecast at the same time: 
                                                 
9 In regressions as the ones used hereafter, the problem due to the correlation between forecast errors leads to 
calculate robust standard errors to serial correlation. Indeed, when forecasts for four quarters ahead miss an 
unexpected change in the variable, this would definitely cause forecasts errors all in the same direction. Forecasts 
are then declared serially correlated. In order to deal with this problem, when considering forecasts for inflation h 
quarters ahead, the standard errors are computed correcting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
according to the Newey and West’s HAC Consistent Covariances method.   9
[]
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The objective of this univariate regression is to assess the validity of the previous regression 
with forecasts combination by simply comparing the statistical tools of significance of the 
model between the different forecasts, so as to ensure that the explanatory power found in 
the main regression is still valid when forecasts are compared one by one and not together. It 
is then informative to look at the R², the significance of the coefficient associated to the 
forecast  CBorPS β and in what extent this one is near to 1.  
 
Results 
For Sweden, table 1a displays Mean Square Errors for quarterly forecasts and shows that 
CPI’s Riksbank errors are largely smaller than those of CF, while quite similar for GDP. 
When comparing in table 1b with Prospera’s survey, CPI forecasts’ errors of the central bank 
are lower than those from all respondents, but are similar then those from money market 
players. Individual forecasts from table 1c confirm that the superiority of the Riksbank is not 
only on the mean of Consensus Forecasts’ respondents but also on almost each individual 
respondent for inflation. Finally, table 1d displays regressions that strongly validate these 
findings for CPI and let suppose that if the Riksbank has an advantage on GDP, evidence is 
in this case more mixed. These last outcomes are confirmed by the R² of the univariate 
regressions that show a higher predictive power of the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts. 
 
For the UK, table 2a, 2b and 2c shows Mean Square Errors respectively of the Bank of 
England compared to Consensus Forecasts on current and the six next quarters, to Gfk-NOP 
survey for 1 year ahead inflation forecasts, and to SEF 2 years ahead. Forecasts errors are 
globally very similar and not significantly different either for inflation than for GDP. One can 
only note that for inflation at long horizons (Q+4, Q+6 and 2 years ahead) private forecasters 
have a very little advantage on the BoE.  Regressions (table 2d) do not show evidence of any 
informational advantage in favor of one or the other actor and confirm the previous results. 
 
For  Canada, table 3a and 3b present Mean Square Errors of both institutions and show 
slightly better forecasts for Consensus Forecasts at short horizons and equivalent accuracy at 
longer horizons for both CPI and GDP. We have nevertheless to keep in mind that CF 
benefits from a strong (2 months) timing advantage. The regression analysis in table 3c 
specifies the results: with a base timing, there is a no clear-cut advantage of CF on short 
horizons (which is more visible for GDP) while similar forecast errors at longer horizons. 
With the timing correction, the weak advantage of CF disappears and there is no evidence of 
any informational advantage in favor of one or the other. 
 
For  Japan, results are hardly interpretable in order to evaluate a potential information 
asymmetry. Focusing on current year forecasts, Mean Square Errors of CPI forecasts (table 
4a) are equivalent, while regressions (table 4b) give more weight to the BoJ. For GDP, MSEs 
are significantly smaller for the Bank of Japan (BoJ), but regressions do not confirm this 
outcome. All in all, there is no evidence of any informational advantage. 
 
For  Switzerland, results for current year CPI forecasts are mixed between Mean Square 
Errors (very close, see table 5a) and regressions (table 5b) and with-in regressions. At the 
contrary, the pattern for next year forecasts appears a little bit clearer: Consensus Forecasts 
has a small advantage on the central bank. 
 
 
   10
Discussion 
All in all, Sweden is the only central bank of the set to benefit from a clear informational 
advantage on private agents on inflation. There is no evidence of any advantage for Canada 
and Japan. For the UK and Switzerland, while there is no more evidence for forecasts at short 
horizons, central banks seem not to have as good inflation forecasts as private agents for 
longer horizons. 
In comparison to the literature, Boero, Smith and Wallis (2008) find that the SEF average 
point forecast of inflation outperforms the BoE’s forecast. We confirm this specific result but 
limit its scope. Indeed, SEF is constructed asking for forecasts of the fourth quarter of the 
current year, of the following year and two years ahead, so at longer horizons than in 
Consensus Forecast. In this study, due to data availability, we focus on SEF’s forecasts two 
year ahead. The comparison with Consensus Forecasts shows that while there is an 
advantage on inflation for private agents at longer horizons, both actors are equal for short 
horizons inflation forecasts. Moreover, Blix, Wadefjord, Wienecke and Adahl (2001) make a 
comprehensive work on the forecasting performance of 250 major institutions and finds 
among other patterns that growth is more difficult to forecast than inflation. This result is 
confirmed for 4 out of 5 countries, the Bank of Canada and private agents having a better 
record for GDP forecasts. In general, the relative good forecasting performance of surveys 
legitimates the choice to consider them as proxy of forecasts of private agents10. 
 
The results obtained in this section can be compared to those in Hubert (2008), in which the 
Fed, a secret central bank that publishes its forecasts with a 5-year lag, is shown to benefit 
from an informational advantage on private agents about inflation. This comparison shed 
light on the possible sources of informational advantage.  
First, the institutional and inherent advantage due to the advance knowledge of future policy 
path can be reconsidered. Four out of five central banks do not benefit from it. This appears 
to be confirmed by the fact that Sweden, the only country where the central bank experiences 
a significant informational advantage, is also the only one in our set to publish explicit 
interest rate paths. It might be an advantage for the central bank on private agents, but it is 
not a sufficient condition. Interest rate path results from macroeconomic forecasts and are in 
fact endogenous to the specific expertness of the central bank. Second, on can note that 
secrecy does not confer either an advantage to the central bank, as Sweden example 
demonstrates. Advantage of relative bigger information set due to non-publication of its 
forecasts is not a sufficient condition as well to explain Fed’s informational advantage. Third, 
the monetary framework does not seem to play a role in benefiting from an informational 
advantage, as there are major institutional, status and strategic differences between the Fed 
and the Riksbank. 
These findings reinforce the argument that informational advantage of some central banks 
stems from some specific expertness, in comparison to the institutional aspects cited above. 
 
Communication impact on private agents’ forecasting ability  
Finally, we infer from a simple analysis of forecast errors whether communication of 
information tends to improve private agents ability to forecast, according to the theoretical 
debate on the implications of release of information, positive for Morris and Shin (2002) and 
Svensson (2005) and negative for Amador and Weill (2008). Figures 1 show root mean 
square errors for CPI and GDP forecasts of private agents gathered in Consensus Forecasts, 
for the period from 1999Q2 to 2007Q4. These figures could be separate in three categories. 
                                                 
10 One might even consider that respondents to these surveys are generally the better informed agents through a 
selection bias. This reinforces anyway the use of these surveys when assessing information asymmetry with the 
central bank.    11
Those for which the publication of forecasts by the central bank has started before our 
sample, namely both figures for the UK, can hardly shed light on this debate. We can only 
note that errors are varying considerably from 0 to 1.25-1.5 percentage point. The second 
category includes forecasts in countries for which central banks have started to publish 
forecasts at the beginning of our sample, as Sweden for CPI, Japan for CPI and GDP, and 
Switzerland for CPI. This configuration does not allow to compare with previous RMSE but 
if we suppose there is a learning mechanism at work and that private agents are not able to 
use central bank forecasts instantaneously, we can observe the effects of forecasts’ 
communication after its setting-up. For CPI forecasts in Sweden and Japan, and Switzerland, 
figures do not show an increase in forecasting ability. For GDP forecasts in Japan, the picture 
is different: forecast errors are regularly decreasing. However, this does not seem robust as it 
is concomitant with a stabilisation of the GDP growth rate. Low forecast errors in a context of 
highest variance of the GDP growth rate as in the beginning of the sample would be more 
convincing evidence. Last, the third category comprises situations in which central banks 
have started to publish forecasts in the middle of the sample: Sweden for GDP and Canada 
for CPI and GDP. There is no evidence either of improve of forecasting ability after the 
publication of central banks’ forecasts. The simple analysis introduced here appears then to 
confirm Amador and Weill (2008)’s statement. 
 
 
5. Influence of Central Banks 
 
We now assess in what extent the central bank or private sector, represented by surveys of 
Consensus Forecasts, influences the other. Here again, we consider the influence power of 
each actor through its forecasts. Practically, we calculate whether the central bank’s (resp. the 
private sector) publication of forecasts influence private sector’s (resp. central bank). 
Two tests are implemented. The first one is a simple test of Granger causality between 
forecasts of private sector and central bank.  
11
hh h h
tt C B t P S t t CB or PS CB PS α ββε −− = +⋅ +⋅ +  
We evaluate the influence of the central bank (resp. the private sector) regarding the 
significance of the coefficient associated to its forecast in the regression where the dependent 
variable is the private sector’s forecast (resp. the central bank).  
 
Because the Granger causality test compares series of forecasts at the same horizon, there is 
weak practical basis that forecasts for current (or next) quarter is influenced by the forecasts 
at the previous date for current (or next) quarter. It seems more plausible that forecasts for a 
given future quarter is influenced by previous forecasts for this same given future quarter.11 
We therefore introduce a second test, in which we assess the influence of each actor for the 
construction of a forecast at the given date for the given horizon, through the forecasts of both 
actors at the previous date for one horizon later.12 The generic form of the regression is then 
the following, with i being the time-lag we want to introduce: 
h h hi hi
tt C B t i P S t i t CB or PS CB PS α ββε
++
−− = +⋅ +⋅ +  
Here again, we test whether the coefficient associated to CB’s forecast is significant or not in 
determining the PS’s forecast. We test for each country for various horizon h and date t, in 
order to assure of the robustness of our results. 
                                                 
11 Theoretically however, both tests are consistent as agents are supposed to incorporate all information available 
at date t in their decision making process. 
12 Due to series’ format and differences between the rhythm of publication and horizon of forecasts, the forecast 
for the next horizon (the next year) that is supposed to give information on the forecast for the current year is 
shifted back 4 periods for Switzerland (quarterly publications).   12
In this set of tests, we do not infer influence with accuracy of the forecasts. We evaluate 
whether the central bank forecasts are based on its forecasts or on those of the private sector. 
In other words, we do not consider whether it is desirable that the central bank use good or 
bad quality forecasts or whether it use only its information, while it could be optimal to take 
into account private sector’s information. We focus beyond these considerations on the 
influence of each actor on the other. 
 
Results 
For Sweden, table 6a presents the Granger causality analysis. It shows that for CPI, private 
sector’s forecasts are never significant when the central bank’s forecasts are the dependant 
variable, while this latter is significant at 1% in the private sector equation. Concerning GDP, 
there is no evidence of influence in either direction. Table 6b shows the influence tests and 
gathering horizons and dates of forecasts, the two previous results are confirmed: the 
Riksbank has a clear influence on private sector for CPI. Its coefficients are always significant 
at 1%. There is no influence for GDP from either side. In general, we can note that influence 
from the central bank is more visible for the most recent forecasts. 
 
For the UK, table 7a provides the Granger causality tests. These ones show that for RPIX and 
CPI-H, there is a strong influence of the central bank, as forecasts are very significant for the 
determination of the private sector’s forecasts and the inverse is not true. For GDP, there is 
no influence from one to the other. Influence tests are gathered in table 7b. Influence of the 
central bank is robustly confirmed for inflation. The switch to CPI-H still presents an 
influential power of the BoE, but only visible for the last forecasts (those made in t-1). Last, 
we can note that there is evidence for influence from the central bank concerning GDP for 
forecasts of current quarter made recently (t-1, t-2). 
 
For Canada, table 8a shows Granger causality tests. In the base specification (for which there 
is a timing advantage of 2 months for Consensus Forecasts), CF’s forecasts are always 
significant for CPI, though at different levels according to horizons observed. When 
considering the timing correction specification, there is no evidence of influence from either 
side: forecasts of the one are respectively significant in determining the forecasts of the other. 
Concerning GDP and comparing both specifications, it appears that there is also no 
respective influence. Table 8b confirms it seems that no influence is exerted from either actor. 
No clear evidence arises from these calculations. 
 
For next both countries studied, because forecasts are published in fixed horizon scheme and 
very little data are available, there are no many specifications to test the robustness of our 
results. We then reintroduce for each test the univariate regressions. We now compare the 
weight of the forecasts of each actor in determining the forecasts of the other. Appreciation of 
influence is made with the value of the coefficient associated to forecasts and the R². 
 
For Japan, outcomes from table 9 are straightforward. Whatever the forecasts are for CPI or 
GDP, the BoJ influences the private sector. These results are consistent with those of 
Fujiwara (2005). 
 
For Switzerland, it has to be noted first that the influence tests have not the same content 
here than previously. Indeed, the regressors here are still forecasts made one quarter before 
but for the next calendar year. Results (tables 10) show that for forecasts of current year, 
there seems to be an influence of the private sector, however not firmly confirmed by 
univariate regressions; and likewise for forecasts of next year, evidence is mixed and do not 
allow to conclude on a possible influential power.   13
 
Discussion 
Finally, Sweden, the UK and Japan display strong influence of the central bank on private 
agents through inflation forecasts, while for Canada and Switzerland evidence is mixed. 
There is no clear empirical support for influence of the private sector on policymakers. In 
general, influence is more significant from the nearest forecasts (those made in t-1 and t-2). 
Similarly, influence is more significant for forecasts at very short horizons (current or next 
quarters). Evidence of influential power of GDP forecasts is weak, and these two patterns are 
besides the limits of the scope of central bank influence when there is.  
It has to be noted that there is no clear relation between informational advantage and 
influence. Switzerland experiences some slight informational advantage of private sector but 
no evidence of influence, while the BoE is in the same situation of lower forecast accuracy 
compared to private sector but clearly influences it. Similarly, central banks of Sweden, Japan 
and the UK influence all three their respective private sector, with different degrees of 
informational advantage. We can only note that at both extreme: Sweden has the most 
pronounced informational advantage and the most stated evidence of influential power, 
whereas Switzerland for which there is signs of asymmetry in favour of private agents, 
evidence of influence of the central bank is the weakest and of private sector the most 
perceptible. 
 
Thus, while publication of forecasts allows dissemination of information about the views, 
models and preferences of the central bank, this paper suggests that central bank need not to 
be more informed to be influential. One possible interpretation of the influence of central 
banks’ forecasts might arise from coordination games between economic agents to form their 
expectations. In a context of imperfect information and higher order expectations, central 
banks’ forecasts may be view as a signal from an actor that can be acknowledged as the 
leader in the monetary policy game. Influence may then stem from a recognized position of 





In this paper, we contribute to the literature in two ways: first, we provide an empirical 
assessment of the potential information asymmetry between the central bank and private 
agents, in five countries for which central banks publish forecasts. We find that only one out 
of five, the Riksbank, benefits from an informational advantage. Differences between these 
central banks and the Fed suggest that advance knowledge of future policy path, secrecy and 
the institutional framework are not sufficient conditions for higher forecasts accuracy 
compared to private agents. Second, we test the influential power of central bank’s forecasts 
on private agents’ and the inverse. We find that in three out of five countries, Sweden, the 
UK and Japan, the central bank influences the private sector. There is no support in our 
results of a direct link between private information and influence. One possible source for 
this influence of central banks might then be its position of leader in expectations’ formation. 
 
Lastly, it is possible that the sample used in this study is too short to examine informational 
advantage and influence of central banks, especially in the case of Canada for which the 
central bank has started only five years ago to publish forecasts and there is a strong timing 
issue with private forecasts. However, significant evidence is all the more so noteworthy 
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CPI - Riksbank
CPI - Consensus 
Forecasts
p-value
Current 0.05 0.30 0.19
Q+1 0.21 0.43 0.17
Q+2 0.32 0.70 0.17
Q+3 0.46 0.91 0.13
Q+4 0.57 1.07 0.11
Q+5 0.80 1.25 0.09
Q+6 0.99 1.52 0.03
GDP - Riksbank
GDP - Consensus 
Forecasts
p-value
Current 0.67 0.60 0.69
Q+1 0.80 0.87 0.77
Q+2 0.93 0.96 0.92
Q+3 0.71 0.95 0.39
Q+4 0.68 1.03 0.25
Q+5 0.60 1.11 0.11
Q+6 0.63 1.19 0.04
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central 
bank errors and private sector errors are equal.
1a. Mean Square Errors for CPI-GDP forecasts
Riksbank Riksbank
National Institute - NIER 0.14 0.14 HQ Bank 0.85
JP Morgan 0.16 Nordea  1.12
Morgan Stanley 0.17 1.13
Nordea 0.21 SE  Banken 1.14
MEAN 0.22 Svenska Handelsbanken 1.32
HQ Bank 0.23 MEAN 1.35
Merrill Lynch 0.26 Öhman 1.41
SE Banken 0.26 JP Morgan 1.46
Öhman 0.30 Morgan Stanley 1.52
Confed of Swed Enterprise 0.35 National Institute - NIER 1.54
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.41 Merrill Lynch 1.56
Confed of Swed Enterprise 1.90
Finanskonsult 0.76 0.17 Finanskonsult 1.77 1.36
Alfred Berg 0.57 0.17 Alfred Berg 1.92 1.53
Swedbank 0.31 0.12 Swedbank 1.24 0.89
UBS 0.25 0.12 UBS 0.97 0.89
Skandiabanken 0.37 0.10 Skandiabanken 0.50 0.53
SBAB 0.15 0.11 SBAB 0.62 0.60
Econ Intelligence Unit 0.46 0.12 Econ Intelligence Unit 0.95 0.74
ING Financial Markets 0.41 0.12 ING Financial Markets 0.59 0.74
from 2003 to 2007 from 2003 to 2007
from 2004 to 2007 from 2004 to 2007
from 2000 to 2007 from 2000 to 2007
from 2002 to 2007 from 2002 to 2007
from 1999 to 2005 from 1999 to 2005
from 1999 to 2004 from 1999 to 2004
from 1999 to 2007 from 1999 to 2007
CPI forecasts GDP forecasts
1c. MSE for Individual forecasts














Prospera - ALL 1.60 0.11
Prospera - Money Market Players 1.30 0.45
Riksbank p-value
Prospera - ALL 1.62 0.29
Prospera - Money Market Players 1.31 0.32 1.36
1.18
1b. Mean Square Errors for CPI forecasts
1 year ahead (Q+4)
2 years ahead (Q+8)17 
Variable CPI GDP
Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h
CB
h=0
t 0.885*** 1.162** 0.950*** 0.487*
(0.026) (0.410) (0.027) (0.240)
PS
h=0
t 0.079* -0.965 0.810*** 0.429
(0.038) (0.603) (0.189) (0.274)
R² 0.94 0.43 0.93 0.67 0.29 0.15
CB
h=1
t 0.890*** 1.118*** 0.993*** 0.378
(0.100) (0.345) (0.082) (0.215)
PS
h=1
t 0.132* -1.507*** 0.843*** -0.129
(0.066) (0.420) (0.218) (0.436)
R² 0.74 0.51 0.74 0.52 0.16 0.01
CB
h=2
t 1.036*** 0.980** 1.044*** 0.126
(0.134) (0.421) (0.112) (0.361)
PS
h=2
t 0.012 -1.876*** 0.709** -0.606
(0.083) (0.577) (0.345) (0.583)
R² 0.61 0.34 0.61 0.27 0.01 0.08
CB
h=3
t 1.118*** 0.780** 1.128*** 0.415
(0.178) (0.319) (0.180) (0.287)
PS
h=3
t 0.028 -1.591 0.538 -0.597
(0.118) (0.880) (0.489) (1.073)
R² 0.45 0.21 0.45 0.08 0.09 0.02
CB
h=4
t 1.107*** 0.817 1.110*** 0.812**
(0.324) (0.577) (0.325) (0.273)
PS
h=4
t 0.028 -0.023 0.29 1.246
(0.172) (1.735) (0.427) (0.819)
R² 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.02 0.19 0.06
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
CPI GDP
1d. Regressions18 
Variable RPIX CPI GDP
Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h
CB
h=0
t 0.799* 0.535 0.381 0.746*** 0.977*** 0.510***
(0.381) (0.715) (0.415) (0.134) (0.244) (0.172)
PS
h=0
t -0.070 0.581 0.143 0.762*** 1.178*** 0.497**
(0.399) (0.770) (0.556) (0.158) (0.250) (0.238)
R² 0.57 0.66 0.26 0.57 0.44 0.64 0.63 0.26 0.24
CB
h=1
t 0.493 0.481 0.361 0.658** 0.775** 0.391**
(0.853) (0.566) (0.267) (0.239) (0.322) (0.175)
PS
h=1
t 0.235 0.421 0.043 0.785*** 0.969* 0.359
(0.933) (1.026) (0.406) (0.177) (0.478) (0.259)
R² 0.34 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.12 0.09
CB
h=2
t 0.668 -0.297 0.335 0.681*** 0.582 0.188
(0.485) (0.836) (0.257) (0.153) (0.503) (0.240)
PS
h2
t 0.022 1.501 -0.358 0.761** 1.129* -0.114
(0.683) (1.025) (0.366) (0.265) (0.521) (0.282)
R² 0.31 0.29 0.05 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.28 0.02 0.00
CB
h=3
t 0.420 -0.553* 0.027 0.490* 0.712** -0.099
(0.350) (0.281) (0.296) (0.281) (0.229) (0.370)
PS
h=3
t 0.337 3.074*** -0.969** 0.891 2.313*** -0.960**
(0.687) (0.680) (0.394) (0.568) (0.497) (0.390)
R² 0.13 0.56 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.52 0.00 0.16
CB
h=4
t 0.457 0.076 -0.023 0.43 -0.66 -0.003
(0.285) (3.691) (0.486) (0.285) (0.883) (0.563)
PS
h=4
t -0.499 -2.228 -1.279** -0.259 -2.019 -1.278
(0.996) (9.338) (0.469) (1.249) (1.953) (0.456)
R² 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.16
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
2d. Regressions
RPIX CPI GDP
BoE - Constant 
Rate




Current 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.46
Q+1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.89
Q+2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.78
Q+3 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.80
Q+4 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.96
Q+5 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.67
Q+6 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.11
BoE - Constant 
Rate




Current 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.97
Q+1 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.51
Q+2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.95
Q+3 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.93
Q+4 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.04
Q+5 0.62 0.57 0.48 0.11
Q+6 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.05
BoE - Constant 
Rate




Current 0.57 0.58 0.68 0.38
Q+1 0.65 0.65 0.78 0.37
Q+2 0.71 0.71 0.87 0.36
Q+3 0.75 0.74 0.84 0.67
Q+4 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.67
Q+5 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.54
Q+6 0.36 0.35 0.52 0.34
2a. Mean Square Errors for quarterly forecasts
RPIX - 1999.2 - 2003.4
CPI - 2005.1 - 2007.4
GDP - 1999.2 - 2007.4
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central 






2c. MSE for 2 years ahead forecasts
RPIX & CPI-H
BoE -Constant rate 0.26
BoE -Market rate 0.26
Gfk-NOP 0.22
p-value 0.55
2b. MSE for 1 year ahead forecasts
Tables 2 - Forecasts’ Accuracy of central bank and private sector in the UK 
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CPI - BoC CPI - CF p-value p-value
Current 0.38 0.22 0.05 Consensus Forecasts 0.21
Q+1 0.43 0.34 0.17 Bank of Canada 0.20
Q+2 0.65 0.40 0.07
Q+3 0.48 0.45 0.71
Q+4 0.46 0.46 0.98
GDP - BoC GDP - CF p-value
Current 0.17 0.10 0.03
Q+1 0.36 0.14 0.01
Q+2 0.34 0.33 0.83
Q+3 0.30 0.34 0.75
Q+4 0.25 0.19 0.32
3a. MSE of Quarterly forecasts
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that
the central bank and private sector errors are equal.
2003Q2 - 2007Q4
2005Q2 - 2007Q4
the central bank and private sector errors are equal.
3b. MSE of Annual Average Real GDP forecasts
from 2002 to 2007
0.811
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that
Variable CPI GDP CPI GDP
Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h
CB
h=0
t -0.161 -0.699** 0.492*** 0.829*** CB
h=0
t 0.436 0.249
(0.435) (0.309) (0.158) (0.255) (0.288) (0.651)
PS
h=0
t 1.101 2.345*** 0.876*** 1.469*** PS
h=1
t-1 0.122 0.731
(0.697) (0.438) (0.251) (0.173) (0.280) (0.882)
R² 0.41 0.88 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.81 R² 0.26 0.52
CB
h=1
t 0.115 -0.925** 0.409** 0.269 CB
h=1
t 0.330 0.141
(0.256) (0.381) (0.187) (0.368) (0.483) (0.733)
PS
h=1
t 0.433 1.753*** 0.551** 1.010*** PS
h=2
t-1 0.159 0.117
(0.335) (0.416) (0.242) (0.271) (0.660) (1.184)
R² 0.22 0.75 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.51 R² 0.19 0.03
CB
h=2
t -0.318 -0.420 0.095 0.001 CB
h=2
t -0.264 0.391
(0.199) (1.130) (0.310) (0.776) (0.325) (1.249)
PS
h2
t 0.780** 0.500 0.527* 0.280 PS
h3
t-1 0.985 -0.913
(0.263) (0.690) (0.293) (0.476) (0.791) (1.331)
R² 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.03 R² 0.08 0.02
CB
h=3
t 0.277 1.318 0.452 0.439 CB
h=3
t -0.051 -0.022
(0.424) (1.302) (0.456) (0.923) (0.207) (1.070)
PS
h=3
t 0.362 -2.065 0.562 -0.283 PS
h=4
t-1 -0.173 -0.082
(0.542) (1.084) (0.561) (1.008) (0.779) (2.705)
R² 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.00 R² 0.00 0.00
CB
h=4
t 0.011 0.866 0.000 0.219
(0.326) (1.303) (0.349) (0.384)
PS
h=4
t -0.192 -2.144 -0.191 -0.133
(0.772) (5.169) (0.775) (2.292)
R² 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00





Base (2 months gap)





CPI - Current Year 0.039 0.036 0.876
CPI - Next Year 0.162 0.103 0.251
GDP - Current Year 0.364 0.674 0.052
GDP - Next Year 0.313 0.509 0.473
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central 
bank's constant rate errors and private sector errors are equal.
4a. Mean Square Errors for annual forecasts
BNS CF p-value
CPI - Current Year 0.027 0.019 0.077
CPI - Next Year 0.250 0.124 0.044
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central 
bank's constant rate errors and private sector errors are equal.




















R² 0.13 0.04 0.10
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 




Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h Yt+h
CB
h=0
t 0.551** 0.482 0.725*** 0.681***
(0.207) (0.302) (0.071) (0.060)
PS
h=0
t 0.216 0.176 0.785*** 0.557***
(0.233) (0.246) (0.064) (0.066)
R² 0.87 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.78 0.74
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
4b. Regressions
CPI GDP























































t-1 1.014*** 0.997*** 0.875*** 0.537*** CB
2
t-1 0.962*** 0.800*** 1.084*** 0.429*** CB
3
t-1 1.123*** 0.772*** 0.605 0.232
(0.101) (0.115) (0.224) (0.137) (0.119) (0.109) (0.324) (0.137) (0.138) (0.063) (0.465) (0.186)
PS
1
t-1 0.035 -0.004 -0.367 0.213 PS
2
t-1 0.086 0.132 -0.645 0.420 PS
3
t-1 0.037 0.181 -0.167 0.527
(0.081) (0.133) (0.413) (0.247) (0.073) (0.149) (0.423) (0.307) (0.106) (0.111) (0.523) (0.359)
R² 0.79 0.84 0.50 0.76 R² 0.72 0.76 0.45 0.72 R² 0.70 0.76 0.23 0.37
CB
2
t-2 1.011*** 0.884*** 0.764* 0.636** CB
3
t-2 1.008*** 0.882*** 0.641 0.265 CB
4
t-2 1.322*** 0.832*** 0.751** 0.237
(0.132) (0.138) (0.364) (0.239) (0.194) (0.124) (0.520) (0.261) (0.279) (0.124) (0.241) (0.222)
PS
2
t-2 0.129 0.158 -0.533 -0.106 PS
3
t-2 0.222 0.257* -1.034* 0.013 PS
4
t-2 0.296* 0.431*** -2.054*** -0.587
(0.084) (0.149) (0.639) (0.365) (0.132) (0.134) (0.545) (0.416) (0.156) (0.138) (0.485) (0.388)
R² 0.64 0.65 0.21 0.45 R² 0.48 0.57 0.16 0.11 R² 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.13
CB
3
t-3 1.148*** 0.954*** 0.520 0.460 CB
4
t-3 1.290*** 1.002*** 1.155*** 0.611***
(0.182) (0.130) (0.411) (0.338) (0.313) (0.195) (0.266) (0.131)
PS
3
t-3 0.085 0.308* -1.072 -0.254 PS
4
t-3 0.296 0.372* -2.919** -1.640**
(0.149) (0.173) (1.005) (0.591) (0.206) (0.188) (1.232) (0.606)
R² 0.47 0.49 0.07 0.16 R² 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.50
CB
4
t-4 1.092*** 1.113*** 1.626*** 1.245***
(0.347) (0.315) (0.332) (0.241)
PS
4
t-4 0.270 0.358* -3.878*** -2.424**
(0.196) (0.196) (0.778) (1.056)
R² 0.27 0.32 0.61 0.59




























t-1 0.765*** 0.870*** 0.915** 0.359
(0.148) (0.119) (0.386) (0.246)
PS
h
t-1 0.060 -0.014 -0.605 0.291
(0.093) (0.092) (0.541) (0.333)
R² 0.57 0.73 0.39 0.66
CB
h
t-1 0.925*** 0.837*** 0.843** 0.344***
(0.143) (0.062) (0.362) (0.111)
PS
h
t-1 -0.048 -0.017 -0.473 0.239
(0.105) (0.047) (0.414) (0.235)
R² 0.65 0.78 0.39 0.67
CB
h
t-1 0.772*** 0.591*** 0.898*** 0.198
(0.185) (0.074) (0.263) (0.140)
PS
h
t-1 -0.082 0.026 -0.688* 0.321
(0.105) (0.074) (0.380) (0.317)
R² 0.41 0.56 0.41 0.45
CB
h
t-1 0.705*** 0.436*** 0.645** 0.078
(0.237) (0.091) (0.282) (0.144)
PS
h
t-1 0.034 0.157* -0.523 0.263
(0.105) (0.087) (0.521) (0.338)
R² 0.37 0.54 0.32 0.13
CB
h
t-1 0.785*** 0.305*** 0.697*** 0.095
(0.150) (0.083) (0.224) (0.148)
PS
h
t-1 0.048 0.298* -0.687 0.239
(0.096) (0.169) (0.634) (0.276)
R² 0.54 0.41 0.37 0.12
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant 










6a. Granger Causality Tests
h=4 h=4
h=3
Tables 6 - Influence of central bank and private sector in Sweden 
















t-1 0.585* 0.616** 0.103 0.574** 0.880*** 0.499*
(0.299) (0.233) (0.354) (0.235) (0.229) (0.268)
PS
h
t-1 0.086 0.079 0.473 -0.203 -0.249 0.221
(0.402) (0.343) (0.456) (0.304) (0.246) (0.262)
R² 0.40 0.59 0.38 0.34 0.50 0.62
CB
h
t-1 1.083*** 0.943*** 0.246 0.574** 0.738*** 0.135
(0.342) (0.242) (0.300) (0.220) (0.186) (0.173)
PS
h
t-1 -0.476 -0.342 0.577 0.039 -0.163 0.485***
(0.370) (0.249) (0.454) (0.373) (0.235) (0.170)
R² 0.58 0.78 0.62 0.62 0.47 0.50
CB
h
t-1 0.940*** 0.896*** 0.431 0.718*** 0.570*** 0.008
(0.247) (0.193) (0.330) (0.173) (0.157) (0.116)
PS
h
t-1 -0.463 -0.678** 0.374 -0.091 -0.128 0.545***
(0.274) (0.289) (0.482) (0.260) (0.226) (0.140)
R² 0.47 0.62 0.44 0.56 0.33 0.35
CB
h
t-1 0.745*** 0.321*** 0.626 0.847** 0.502*** -0.109
(0.199) (0.076) (0.398) (0.291) (0.146) (0.071)
PS
h
t-1 -0.319 -0.151 -0.128 -0.610 -0.009 0.558***
(0.714) (0.192) (0.969) (0.744) (0.264) (0.172)
R² 0.41 0.52 0.23 0.39 0.27 0.27
CB
h
t-1 0.469** 0.069 1.546*** 1.732*** 0.452*** -0.152***
(0.174) (0.085) (0.346) (0.275) (0.162) (0.047)
PS
h
t-1 -0.336 0.281 -2.383* -2.983*** 0.019 0.721***
(0.657) (0.204) (1.108) (0.855) (0.317) (0.240)
R² 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.36 0.21 0.43
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** 
















7a. Granger Causality Tests
RPIX GDP CPIH










































t-1 1.060** 0.864*** 0.246 0.574** 0.694 0.312** CB
2
t-1 1.265*** 0.941*** 0.722 0.754*** 0.692*** 0.200 CB
3
t-1 0.976*** 0.715*** 0.503** 0.504*** 0.663*** 0.129
(0.366) (0.284) (0.300) (0.220) (0.135) (0.135) (0.198) (0.177) (0.417) (0.214) (0.142) (0.121) (0.207) (0.147) (0.213) (0.131) (0.178) (0.109)
PS
1
t-1 -0.205 0.036 0.577 0.039 0.221 0.685*** PS
2
t-1 -0.602** -0.256 -0.100 -0.202 0.222 0.796*** PS
3
t-1 -0.444 -0.417 0.258 0.190 0.124 0.808***
(0.430) (0.348) (0.454) (0.373) (0.187) (0.138) (0.244) (0.253) (0.538) (0.255) (0.256) (0.158) (0.656) (0.647) (0.319) (0.174) (0.284) (0.179)
R² 0.63 0.80 0.62 0.62 0.74 0.83 R² 0.75 0.82 0.58 0.70 0.58 0.66 R² 0.57 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.39 0.45
CB
2
t-2 0.597* 0.856*** 0.299 -0.044 0.588** 0.359** CB
3
t-2 0.740*** 0.707*** 0.236 -0.182 0.549** 0.157 CB
4
t-2 0.322 0.332** -0.775 -1.003** 0.630** -0.058
(0.334) (0.231) (0.371) (0.525) (0.222) (0.163) (0.242) (0.212) (0.347) (0.315) (0.263) (0.189) (0.211) (0.148) (0.697) (0.318) (0.244) (0.165)
PS
2
t-2 0.405 -0.106 0.552 0.732 0.109 0.426 PS
3
t-2 -0.328 -0.664 0.515 0.999 0.019 0.338 PS
4
t-2 -1.690* -1.140* 2.565 2.572** -0.202 0.334
(0.415) (0.324) (0.638) (0.911) (0.284) (0.253) (0.744) (0.549) (0.915) (0.654) (0.402) (0.328) (0.819) (0.640) (2.203) (0.872) (0.442) (0.499)
R² 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.38 R² 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.08 R² 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.04
CB
3
t-3 0.597* 0.585* -0.160 -0.044 0.481* 0.323 CB
4
t-3 0.238 0.174 -1.025 -0.898 0.498* 0.058
(0.299) (0.289) (0.296) (0.291) (0.257) (0.270) (0.309) (0.201) (1.027) (0.859) (0.249) (0.304)
PS
3
t-3 -0.072 -0.505 1.762** 1.016 -0.395 -0.134 PS
4
t-3 -1.209 -1.420** 3.135 1.800 -0.429 -0.106
(0.723) (0.640) (0.540) (0.760) (0.395) (0.403) (0.835) (0.555) (2.251) (2.351) (0.532) (0.516)
R² 0.15 0.16 0.56 0.30 0.14 0.07 R² 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.00
CB
4
t-4 0.054 0.176 0.307 -0.223 0.495 0.239
(0.502) (0.398) (2.031) (1.257) (0.339) (0.326)
PS
4
t-4 -0.867 -0.743 -1.161 -0.256 -0.614 -0.440
(1.039) (0.795) (5.726) (3.646) (0.459) (0.512)
















































t-1 -0.380 -0.277 -0.870 -1.004*** CB
h
t-1 0.908*** 0.545*** 1.091*** 0.712**
(0.425) (0.310) (0.466) (0.245) (0.147) (0.140) (0.207) (0.241)
PS
h
t-1 1.304* 0.815 2.151** 1.860*** PS
h
t-2 -0.762*** -0.502*** -0.887 -0.784*
(0.639) (0.467) (0.826) (0.465) (0.126) (0.104) (0.484) (0.381)
R² 0.38 0.28 0.72 0.68 R² 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.36
CB
h
t-1 -0.234 -0.403 -0.393* -0.747** CB
h
t-1 0.749*** 0.430** 0.597 0.370
(0.365) (0.354) (0.177) (0.250) (0.181) (0.158) (0.459) (0.479)
PS
h
t-1 1.021** 0.675 1.118*** 0.946** PS
h
t-2 -0.501** -0.814*** -0.293 -0.644
(0.450) (0.435) (0.314) (0.307) (0.229) (0.215) (0.481) (0.566)
R² 0.41 0.14 0.62 0.42 R² 0.35 0.37 0.16 0.16
CB
h
t-1 -0.365* -0.080 0.728 0.354 CB
h
t-1 0.239 0.462*** 1.038** 0.903***
(0.186) (0.164) (0.433) (0.525) (0.280) (0.099) (0.305) (0.191)
PS
h
t-1 0.924*** 0.232 0.064 0.049 PS
h
t-2 -0.018 -0.834*** -0.341 -0.7445*
(0.273) (0.238) (0.331) (0.348) (0.259) (0.254) (0.358) (0.357)
R² 0.36 0.03 0.36 0.09 R² 0.06 0.49 0.53 0.47
CB
h
t-1 0.170 -0.260 0.451* 0.104 CB
h
t-1 0.260 0.315 0.885 1.092
(0.197) (0.224) (0.218) (0.235) (0.313) (0.263) (0.547) (0.627)
PS
h
t-1 0.528** 0.536*** 1.169** 1.120 PS
h
t-2 0.258 -0.545* -0.147 -1.501
(0.197) (0.177) (0.363) (0.698) (0.345) (0.303) (1.255) (1.265)
R² 0.43 0.18 0.76 0.46 R² 0.24 0.18 0.55 0.44
CB
h
t-1 0.665*** 0.154 -0.667 -0.194 CB
h
t-1 0.645 0.174 0.188 0.000
(0.196) (0.140) (0.565) (0.126) (0.209) (0.144) (0.439) (0.206)
PS
h
t-1 0.058 0.120 3.667 0.968 PS
h
t-2 -0.323 -0.657** 0.625 0.500
(0.253) (0.253) (1.916) (0.459) (0.401) (0.243) (1.446) (0.865)
R² 0.49 0.06 0.66 0.39 R² 0.49 0.38 0.16 0.11
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 










Timing Correction - 1month gap
CPI GDP
h=2












8a. Granger Causality Tests







































t-1 0.187 0.152 0.108 -0.239 CB
1
t-1 0.846*** 0.613*** 1.215** 0.684 CB
2
t-1 0.046 -0.027 0.308 0.047 CB
2
t-1 0.235 0.486 0.680** 1.067*
(0.146) (0.133) (0.186) (0.215) (0.220) (0.191) (0.428) (0.387) (0.156) (0.125) (0.221) (0.516) (0.348) (0.385) (0.232) (0.482)
PS
1
t-1 0.792*** 0.397** 1.035*** 0.923*** PS
2
t-2 -0.127 -0.251 -0.563 -0.400 PS
2
t-1 1.109*** 0.758*** 1.010** 0.738** PS
3
t-2 1.155** -0.164 1.184** -1.096
(0.162) (0.139) (0.262) (0.233) (0.252) (0.197) (0.592) (0.569) (0.173) (0.144) (0.293) (0.308) (0.472) (0.499) (0.439) (0.734)
R² 0.74 0.52 0.90 0.78 R² 0.62 0.50 0.56 0.26 R² 0.74 0.47 0.85 0.41 R² 0.53 0.21 0.55 0.25
CB
2
t-2 0.097 0.055 -0.240 -0.043 CB
2
t-2 0.387 0.065 0.545 0.558 CB
3
t-2 -0.236 0.009 -0.070 0.440 CB
3
t-2 0.076 -0.191 0.810 0.093
(0.145) (0.098) (0.638) (0.613) (0.297) (0.149) (0.715) (0.658) (0.316) (0.303) (0.564) (0.734) (0.474) (0.286) (0.935) (0.443)
PS
2
t-2 0.742*** 0.391* 0.972* 0.416 PS
3
t-3 0.421 0.647* 0.140 -0.528 PS
3
t-2 1.635*** 0.489 2.345** 0.013 PS
4
t-3 1.306 1.473* -0.593 -0.478
(0.230) (0.192) (0.499) (0.381) (0.604) (0.357) (1.170) (0.727) (0.283) (0.341) (0.902) (0.991) (1.151) (0.680) (2.503) (2.003)
R² 0.41 0.25 0.39 0.15 R² 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.09 R² 0.52 0.09 0.48 0.08 R² 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.01
CB
3
t-3 -0.490 -0.254 -0.630 0.288 CB
3
t-3 -0.445 -0.232 -0.265 -0.040 CB
4
t-3 -0.537 -0.256 -0.139 0.764
(0.362) (0.358) 0.967 (0.820) (0.552) (0.715) (0.650) (0.375) (0.756) (0.406) (1.270) (0.837)
PS
3
t-3 1.395*** 0.933** 1.870 -0.019 PS
4
t-4 0.968 0.654 0.580 0.062 PS
4
t-3 1.397 1.435* 1.588 -2.039
(0.386) (0.380) (0.862) (0.713) (0.847) (0.403) (2.943) (1.561) (0.997) (0.678) (3.505) (2.778)
R² 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.04 R² 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.00 R² 0.20 0.27 0.06 0.10
CB
4
t-4 -0.298 -0.073 1.215 0.680
(0.560) (0.298) (1.305) (0.675)
PS
4

















(0.801) (0.391) (3.739) (2.572)
R² 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 CB
3
t-1 0.324 -0.395 0.396** -0.175 CB
3
t-1 0.724* 0.276 0.500 0.518
(0.303) (0.473) (0.139) (0.457) (0.348) (0.340) (0.455) (0.711)
PS
3
t-1 1.135*** 1.344*** 1.380** 1.990*** PS
4
t-2 0.718 0.616 1.000 -0.305
(0.347) (0.408) (0.448) (0.433) (0.876) (0.882) (1.009) (1.484)
R² 0.59 0.45 0.78 0.63 R² 0.26 0.11 0.54 0.11
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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8b. Influence Tests





















t-1 1.252*** 1.037*** 1.480** 1.678** 0.809*** 0.894***
(0.279) (0.132) (0.526) (0.584) (0.092) (0.186)
PS
h
t-1 -0.498 -0.285 -0.725 -0.693 0.787*** 0.449***
(0.327) (0.203) (0.474) (0.611) (0.127) (0.145)
R² 0.73 0.86 0.52 0.61 0.46 0.84 0.29 0.56






















t-1 0.712*** 0.604*** 0.770***
(0.142) (0.136) (0.096)
R² 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.62
CB
h




t-1 -0.727** -0.132 0.795**
(0.341) (0.292) (0.289)
R² 0.45 0.38 0.20 0.37
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means
respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.





















t-1 0.443 0.530 0.701***
(0.417) (0.444) (0.146)
R² 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.26
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means
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Figures 1 – Root Mean Square Errors of private sector forecasts (Consensus Forecasts) 
Sample 1999Q2 – 2007Q4. Left scale: RMSE, Right Scale: Inflation or GDP growth rate. 
 
 